This paper examines optimal price regulation for services assigned by a bureaucrat who might be altruistic. The government authority chooses prices the bureaucrat is allowed to charge that will aect the power of the contract oered by the bureaucrat to the agent. We show that the government allows more altruistic bureaucrats to charge higher prices for higher quality services; this leads to the bureaucrat oering high-powered contracts to the agent.
Introduction
In many countries citizens can obtain services from government agencies faster if they pay an additional fee. For example, in the United States citizens can obtain passport services more quickly if they pay an additional fee, whereas in other countries the price is the same regardless of circumstances. According to the ocial website of the Bureau of Consular Aairs: 1 Generally, you will receive your passport in three weeks, or sooner, if you can show an urgent need. Expedited service will cost an additional $60, plus any delivery costs.
While prices for getting services faster are regulated by the government, bureaucrats have a signicant power in deciding how carefully to scrutinize each case and, as a result, how fast a citizen can get the desired service even after he or she has paid the price.
Bureaucrats providing services to citizens are known to have pro-social motivation 2 . In the language of Benabou and Tirole (2006) , bureaucrats have intrinsic motivation, because they care about what they do. It is common for citizens to interact with bureaucrats who allocate resources under price restrictions imposed by the government.
3 What is puzzling, however, is that the opportunity to get services faster (of higher quality) varies across countries as well as across services within a country. In this paper we study when it is optimal for the government to allow bureaucrats to charge a higher price for obtaining services faster and the eects of this optimal policy on power of the contract oered by the bureaucrat.
In particular we study the role of non-pecuniary motivation and the power of contracts oered by bureaucrats in a model with three layers: a government authority (it), a bureaucrat (she) and an agent (he). In our model the government authority delegates the right to provide services to the bureaucrat but can determine prices the bureaucrat is allowed to charge.
4 The agent has private information about his waiting costs and is oered an incentive contract by the bureaucrat. Our results show that, in the presence of non-pecuniary motivation and private information, the government authority allows a more altruistic bureaucrat to charge the agent a higher price for delivering the service faster. Consequently, a more altruistic bureaucrat oers a high-powered contract to the agent.
A key element of our model is the concept of altruism. The role of pro-social motivation in the provision of public services is well documented 5 . Some bureaucrats working in the 1 See https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/services/expedited.html 2 See, for example, Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) and references therein. 3 See Prendergast (2003) . 4 For example, in Aghion and Tirole (1997) the government has formal authority and delegates real authority to a bureaucrat. 5 See, for example, Gregg et. al. (2011) .
public sector pursue actions not solely because of external rewards, but also because the activity is valuable to them. Others might be purely selsh or, equivalently, not sympathetic to those citizens in a hurry. We assume that the bureaucrat has to exert eort to provide the service to the agent; while the eort is costly, the bureaucrat also cares about the agent's well-being. We say that the bureaucrat is more altruistic if she puts a higher weight on the agent's utility.
Along with non-pecuniary motivation, an important element of our model is the set of prices that the government allows the bureaucrat to charge. Under many circumstances, bureaucrats have signicant freedom in dealing with the agent. However, government authorities in most cases impose restrictions on how much the bureaucrat is allowed to charge for her services. In our model the agent is privately informed about how costly it is for him to wait an additional time for the service: a low (high) type has a smaller (higher) marginal cost of waiting. The combination of this private information and restrictions imposed by the government plays a critical role in our model.
Consider the rst-best scenario, in which the agent's type is observed by the bureaucrat.
For a relatively small price allowed by the government authority or when the bureaucrat is altruistic enough, the agent gets positive rent because the eort level chosen by the bureaucrat is determined by altruistic motives. However, as the price rises, the bureaucrat nds it optimal to work more and, as a result, extracts a higher surplus from the high type agent. In this case the agent's utility weakly decreases in the price chosen by the government authority.
Anticipating this the government will optimally choose not to allow the bureaucrat to charge a higher price for faster services. Thus, if the type of the agent is known to the bureaucrat, the government does not allow the bureaucrat to use dierent prices, and, consequently, the bureaucrat oers the low-powered contract to the agent.
In the second-best case, the government authority faces two problems: it has to take into account the bureaucrat's altruism as well as anticipate the incentive contract that will be oered to the agent. Consider rst the government dealing with a purely selsh bureaucrat who cares only about her cost of eort. The government's optimal price policy determines the power of the optimal contract that will be oered by the bureaucrat to the agent. Since the agent with a low cost of waiting has the incentive to claim having a high cost, the optimal incentive contract oered by the bureaucrat mitigates the rent of the low-type agent: with a higher price for delivering services faster set by the government, the bureaucrat works less for the low type. Therefore, if the type of the agent is private, but the government is facing a selsh bureaucrat, the government will not allow the bureaucrat to use dierent prices, and the bureaucrat will oer the lowest powered contract to the agent, just as in the rst best scenario. This suggests that it is the combination of the bureaucrat's altruism and the agent's private information that makes the government allow the bureaucrat to charge a higher price for faster services, which in turn leads to high-powered contracts oered by the bureaucrat to the agent.
Consider now a case when the price chosen by the government is relatively low and the bureaucrat is mildly altruistic. The incentive contract oered by the bureaucrat is determined by the incentives of the low type to claim being a high type. It is reminiscent of a standard adverse selection problem. The low type may benet from pretending to be high so the bureaucrat mitigates the low type's rent by working less for him. The high type gets no rent. From the government's prospective, allowing the bureaucrat to charge a higher price will only harm the agent. As a result the government does not allow the bureaucrat to charge a higher price for oering faster services; the bureaucrat oers the low-powered contract to the agent.
For a relatively altruistic bureaucrat and high price chosen by the government countervailing incentives emerge. Altruism makes the bureaucrat oer a very high eort for the low type, but then this contract becomes attractive for the high type, who now captures a strictly positive rent. The incentive contract oered by the bureaucrat is now shaped by the incentives of the high type claiming to be low. A higher price announced by the government leads to the bureaucrat working more for the high type and less for the low type. Since the bureaucrat in this case is aiming to mitigate the high type's rent, which decreases in the price announced by the government, it is optimal to prevent the bureaucrat from charging a higher price for faster services.
Finally, consider a very altruistic bureaucrat and a relatively low price set by the government. Now both types receive positive rent. The low type's rent decreases in the price chosen by the government while the high type's rent increases in it. A trade-o for the government authority emerges: a higher price allows for mitigating the low type's rent but increases the rent of the high type. When the high type is relatively rare, it is optimal for the government to set a higher price for delivering the service faster. Thus, our conclusion is that only the mutual presence of the agent's private information and an altruistic bureaucrat makes the government benet from allowing the bureaucrat to charge an additional price for delivering the service faster, which leads to the bureaucrat oering the high-powered contract to the agent.
Our paper is related to the literature on pro-social behavior in the provision of government services. Besley and Ghatak (2005) stress that workers often pursue goals because they receive intrinsic benets from their work. Prendergast (2007 Prendergast ( , 2008 ) study when it is optimal to hire a bureaucrat who is biased toward the client. We contribute to this literature by studying optimal government price policy when facing an altruistic bureaucrat.
Few papers study contracts oered by bureaucrats rather than contracts oered for bureaucrats 6 . The one most related to ours, Khalil et. al. (2013) , studied why bureaucrats may oer a low-powered contract to the agent when they operate under a xed budget determined by the government authority. By considering an altruistic bureaucrat, we provide an alternative explanation of low-powered contracts oered by bureaucrats.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the model and the contract space with payos, and provides a solution for the rst-best benchmark; Section 3 provides a description of the optimal contract oered by the bureaucrat; Section 4 species price policy chosen by the government in the equilibrium; and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Model
We consider a three-level hierarchy model with hidden information: a government authority (it), a bureaucrat (she), and an agent (he) who has private information about his cost of waiting for the government service. The agent desires at most one unit of the service from the government and has a reservation utility u r > 0 which is commonly known by all three parties. We assume that the agent is privately informed about his marginal cost of waiting for the service, c θ , which can take only two values: c H with probability 0 < ν < 1 and c L with
The government authority delegates the task of providing the service to the bureaucrat.
However, it can legally set a base fee, p L 0, that the agent has to pay to get the service and an extra fee, p H 0, that the agent can pay to get the service faster. Bureaucrats enjoy dawdling as delivering the service faster requires exerting eort which is costly. To focus on the government's optimal price policy and its eect on power of the contract oered to the agent we assume that the bureaucrat is paid an exogenously xed wage w B > 0.
7
As we explained in the introduction, the bureaucrat has to incur cost of eort to deliver services faster, nevertheless she also cares about the agent's expected utility. We introduce a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] to represent the bureaucrat's level of altruism, i.e., her intrinsic motivation.
8 Thus, the utility function for the bureaucrat is dened as
where c(e θ ) reects the cost of eort, and e H and e L is an eort level chosen after the agent has paid an additional fee p H and when he has paid only a base fee, p L , respectively. For 6 See Prendergast (2003), Banerjee (1997) and references therein. 7 We assume that w B is high enough so the bureaucrat's participation constraint is always satised. 8 Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) review dierent ways to introduce pro-social motivation into the bureaucrat's utility function. the main part 9 we assume that c(e θ ) = e 2 θ 2 .
We will say that the bureaucrat is purely selsh if λ = 0 and purely altruistic if λ = 1. If λ = 0, the bureaucrat only cares about her cost of eort and is not sympathetic to citizens in a hurry. An example would be an ocer at the Oce of Licensing who issues state driver licenses. If λ = 1, the bureaucrat cares about the agent's utility as much as her cost of eort; an example would be a social worker preparing documents for qualied citizens.
Consequently, a higher λ reects a bureaucrat who has a stronger sympathy for the agent.
10
An agent of type θ, announcing his type asθ, receives utility U A θ (pθ, eθ) from a contract (pθ, eθ):
where xθ = x − eθ is the total waiting time.
Relying on the revelation principle, we use a direct truthful mechanism, where the agent is asked by the bureaucrat to announce his type. Thus, the optimal contract oered buy the bureaucrat to the agent will have to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint for all θ andθ:
In addition, the following individual rationality constraint for all θ must hold:
The government authority controls prices that the bureaucrat is allowed to oer, p L and p H . Without loss of generality we assume that p L = 0 so p H is playing a role of an additional fee. The government authority's objective function is:
To make the adverse selection problem relevant in this model, we impose the following two assumptions. The rst assumption rules out trivial corner solutions:
The second assumption makes sure we do not exclude scenarios with a very altruistic bureaucrats, i.e., for high values of λ :
To summarize, the timing is as follows:
9 Our conclusions are robust to any convex cost function. 10 In our model, preferences of a more altruistic bureaucrat are better aligned with those of the government authority.
1. The agent learns his type θ.
2. The government authority delegates the task of providing the service to the bureaucrat and species p L 0 and p H 0 that the bureaucrat can charge. 3. The bureaucrat oers contracts (p L ; e L ) and (p H ; e H ) to the agent. In case the agent rejects the contract, the game is over and all parties get payos normalized to zero; if the agent accepts the contract, the bureaucrat works accordingly and all parties receive payos as specied in the contract.
The rst-best benchmark
Suppose the bureaucrat can observe the agent's type so the (I C) constraints can be ignored. Given p L = 0 and p H 0 chosen by the government, the bureaucrat's optimization problem becomes:
(IR H )
Note that this optimization problem is dierent from the rst-best benchmark in a standard screening problem. Since now a new parameter λ enters the objective function, the bureaucrat will not necessarily extract all the surplus from the agent. Indeed, as illustrated in Lemma 1 below, if the price chosen by the government, p H , is relatively small or, alternatively, the bureaucrat is altruistic enough the high type retains positive rent.
Lemma 1. Agent's utility in the FB.
Proof : See Appendix A. 
However, as the price is getting higher the bureaucrat nds it optimal to work more and extract the full surplus from the high type. We present graphically each case in the Figure   1 Figure 1 . Contract Oered by the Bureaucrat in the First Best Case.
In the rst best case, the agent's utility is weakly decreasing in the price announced by the government authority, p H . Thus, if the type of the agent is known to the bureaucrat there is no reason to set up an additional fee and the equilibrium price is zero:
p * H = 0. 11 That is, a purely selsh bureaucrat (λ = 0) will not work for the agent at all.
However, we will prove next that when private information presents in the model the government can benet from having a strictly positive price. We consider rst the contract oered by the bureaucrat given the announced price p H . Next, having found the eort level each type of the bureaucrat chooses given her type, we solve for the optimal price that the government will choose in equilibrium.
3 Contracts Oered by the Bureaucrat Before we present solution to the general problem we introduce two benchmarks. First, we consider a purely selsh bureaucrat who is facing an agent of unknown type.
12 This scenario is useful to see how p H chosen by the government determines the power of the contract that will be oered by the bureaucrat in equilibrium. In particular, with a higher p H the bureaucrat will work more for the high type and less so for the low type agent. Second, we consider a case when the bureaucrat must charge the same price regardless of the agent's type.
13 This benchmark will highlight the role of altruism in our model.
Benchmark 1: Selsh Bureaucrat (λ = 0)
Suppose the bureaucrat is purely selsh. Given any p H 0 announced by the government authority the bureaucrat's optimization problem becomes:
As we explained before, the additional fee set by the government, p H , determines the power of the optimal contract oered by the bureaucrat. Since the low type agent has incentives to claim being high, (I C L,H ) and (I R H ) will be binding in equilibrium. As a result, 12 An example would be an ocer supervising driving exams. 13 In some countries, paying an additional price and receiving government services faster would be considered corruption.
This is reminiscent of a standard adverse selection problem: with higher p H the bureaucrat works less for the low type which allows mitigating the low type's rent.
The government authority is aiming to maximize E θ U A θ :
Given that
As a result, the equilibrium price chosen by the government is again zero:
Benchmark 2: No extra fee (p H = 0)
Suppose now the bureaucrat is not allowed to charge dierent prices for delivering services faster. Given p L = p H = 0 announced by the government authority the bureaucrat's optimization problem becomes: 
Ec
) then both types get rent. The government authority is better o assigning a more altruistic bureaucrat. Recall that in our model a more altruistic bureaucrat has preferences more aligned with those of the government. We made this choice to single out the eect of the optimal price policy on power of the contract oered by the bureaucrat to the agent.
General Case
The previous benchmarks suggested the following conclusion: 1) If the bureaucrat is purely selsh then it is never optimal for the government authority to use an additional fee, and 2) If the additional fee is not feasible the government authority is better o assigning a more altruistic bureaucrat. We will show that in a general case government may choose p * H > 0 while the second result still survives, that is, government is weakly better o with a more altruistic bureaucrat.
The bureaucrat's optimization problem given any p H 0 announced by the government authority:
The bureaucrat's problem is now exacerbated by having to address the altruism in addition to all the constraints presented before. First, the (I R L ) constraint is automatically satised. Second, (IR H ), (IC H,L ) and (IC L,H ) may be slack, and any two of the three may be binding simultaneously. While details and the formal proof are in the Appendix A, we now provide some intuition why this happens in the equilibrium. The (I R L ) constraint being satised automatically resembles a standard adverse selection problem: the low type has incentives to lie and, as a result, he will claim a positive rent. In addition, the altruism of the bureaucrat makes her willing to work even more for the low type which increases the rent further.
The second result is unusual. As in the rst benchmark we considered, p H determines the power of the optimal contract oered by the bureaucrat 14 , that is,
14 This follows directly from combining (IC L,H ) and (IC H,L ).
However, now both (I C H,L ) and (I C L,H ) may be slack, and either or both may be binding.
This result is a direct a consequence of bureaucrat's altruism. For instance, as we illustrated in Benchmark 1, this will not be the case if the bureaucrat was purely selsh (λ = 0). The intuition is the following. Consider rst the case when the price chosen by the government authority is relatively high and the bureaucrat is mildly altruistic. In this case, the eect of altruism is not enough to compensate the high price that must be paid by the high type and he gets no rent. As the bureaucrat is getting more altruistic she is now granting more rent to the low type. At this point the contract oered to the low type becomes attractive for the high type: the countervailing incentives emerge. Now the optimal contract becomes determined by the binding (I C H,L ) constraint while (I C L,H ) is slack. Finally, when the bureaucrat is very altruistic and the price chosen by the government authority is fairly small both types get positive rent. We characterize formally the optimal contract oered by bureaucrat in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium contract oered by the bureaucrat.
Proof : See Appendix A.
12
We present graphically an example in the Figure 
Contracts Oered by the Government Authority
We now are back to the government's optimal policy. When the government authority determines the optimal price p * H it anticipates the optimal contract that will be oered by the bureaucrat and, in particular, e H (p H ) and e L (p H ). The government authority's objective is to
where e θ (p H ) is determined in Proposition 1.
When the price chosen by the government is relatively low and the bureaucrat is relatively selsh (Case 1 of Proposition 1) the high type gets no rent for any chosen p H . The low type, however, gets positive rent which is decreasing in p H . This echoes standard adverse selection problem: (I C L,H ) and (I R H ) bind and the low type gets rent. For this case there is no reason for the government to set a positive price and p * H = 0. As the price is getting higher and the bureaucrat more altruistic (Cases 2 of Proposition 1) the (I C L,H ) constraint becomes slack and the low type's rent is unresponsive to the price level. Finally, consider an altruistic bureaucrat and a small price set by the government (Case 6 of Proposition 1). This is the most interesting case and we discuss it in details. For these parameters, only (I C L,H ) is binding and both types receive positive rent. Low type's rent is decreasing in p H as the price acts a screening device: the bureaucrat oers
However, the high type's rent is increasing in p H as e H = λEc Figure 3 above.
The government is choosing p * H to maximize the agent's expected utility. Recall that in the rst-best case there optimal policy was p * H = 0. It turns out in the presence of private information government will choose a strictly positive price, p * H > 0, if the bureaucrat is altruistic enough. An optimal policy trade-os rent paid to the low type via lower eort level e L and high type's rent. As a result, a positive optimal price p * H > 0 is optimal only if the portion of high type in population, ν, is small enough. We characterize formally the optimal contract oered by bureaucrat in Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. Government's optimal policy for ν 1 − c L ∆c
Proof : See Appendix B.
Conclusion
Citizens often have to deal with bureaucrats to get government services. While bureaucrats are known to have intrinsic motivation, they usually operate under government regulation.
For example it is common for the government authority to determine the prices the bureaucrat is allowed to charge, while the right to provide services is delegated to the bureaucrat herself. In this paper we study the optimal government price policy and its eect on the power of the contract oered by the bureaucrat.
If the government faces a selsh bureaucrat who cares only about her cost of eort, there is no reason to let her charge a higher price and deliver services faster. Similar results emerge if an altruistic bureaucrat knows the type of the agent she is dealing with. In both these scenarios, the bureaucrat oers a low-powered incentive contract to the agent. Thus, we show that it is only the altruism of the bureaucrat and the agent's private information that jointly lead to the government allowing bureaucrats to charge a higher price for delivering services faster. Further, only in this case will the bureaucrat oer a high-powered contract to the agent.
While our model certainly misses some nuances, it may be used to explain policies observed in real life. In particular it may explain why in some countries citizens have an opportunity to obtain government services faster if they pay a fee, whereas such policies are prohibited in other countries. Our results suggest that if the government is facing or can pick an altruistic bureaucrat, it will allow the bureaucrat to charge higher prices for getting the service faster. Consequently, the bureaucrat will oer a high-powered contract to citizens. This is indeed what we observe in developed countries: for many services there is an opportunity to expedite deliveries, and social workers are known to exhibit empathy toward their clients. In contrast, if it is hard to appoint an altruistic bureaucrat the government will allow only a small additional price for a better service, and, as a result, the bureaucrat will oer a low-powered contract. 
Labeling α H and α L as the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints associated with (I R H ) and (I R H ) respectively, the optimization problem has the following Lagrangian:
The relevant Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimization problem are:
We show next that (IR H ) and (IR L ) may be slack and any of the two may be binding.
We examine each case below.
Case 1: The (IR L ) constraint binds and (IR H ) is slack. Claim 1:
Proof : Suppose α H = 0 and α L > 0. Then conditions (L1) and (L2) can be rewritten as:
Case 2:
Case 3: The (IR H ) and (IR L ) are slack. Claim 3:
Proof : Suppose α H = α H = 0. Then conditions (L1) and (L2) can be rewritten as: 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
The bureaucrat's optimization problem is the following: (IR H )
In addition, from (I R H ) we have −p H − c H (x − e H ) u r .
Combining the two inequalities above, we conclude that the (I R L ) constraint is automatically satised and can be ignored.
Labeling α H , β H , β L as the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints associated with (I R H ), (I C H,L ) and (I C L,H ) respectively, the optimization problem has the following Lagrangian:
Combining ( Q.E.D. (C1) ν(λc H − e H ) + α H c H = 0;
